



# Journey Beyond Full Abstraction: Exploring Robust Property Preservation for Secure Compilation



**Carmine  
Abate**

Inria Paris



**Rob  
Blanco**

Inria Paris



**Deepak  
Garg**

MPI-SWS




**Cătălin  
Hrițcu**

Inria Paris



**Jérémy  
Thibault**

Inria Paris



**Marco  
Patrignani**

Stanford  
& CISPA

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
## **Good programming languages provide helpful abstractions for writing more secure code**

- structured control flow, procedures, modules, interfaces, correctness and security specifications, ...

## **abstractions not enforced when compiling and linking with adversarial low-level code**

- all source-level security guarantees are lost

# HACL\* verified cryptographic library



# HACL\* verified cryptographic library, in practice

~100.000 LOC in F\*


**HACL\* library**

16.000.000+ LOC in C/C++

**Firefox web browser**


**160x**

# HACL\* verified cryptographic library, in practice





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**Insecure interoperability:** linked code can read and write data and code, jump to arbitrary instructions, smash the stack, ...

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- **Protect source-level abstractions**  
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
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
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





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But what should "secure" mean?

# What properties should we robustly preserve?

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**trace properties**  
(safety & liveness)

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**hyperproperties**  
(noninterference)

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# What properties should we robustly preserve?

**relational  
hyperproperties**  
(trace equivalence)

*new*

**hyperproperties**  
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# What properties should we robustly preserve?

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Robust Relational Hyperproperty Preservation (**RrHP**)

Robust K-Relational Hyperproperty Preservation (**RKrHP**)

Robust 2-Relational Hyperproperty Preservation (**R2rHP**)

Robust Relational Property Preservation (**RrTP**)

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Robust 2-Relational Property Preservation (**R2rTP**)

Robust Relational XSafety Preservation (**RrSP**)

Robust Finite-Relational XSafety Preservation (**RFrSC**)

Robust K-Relational XSafety Preservation (**RKrSP**)

Robust 2-Relational XSafety Preservation (**R2rSP**)

+ *determinacy*

*Robust Trace Equivalence Preservation (RTEP)*

**hyperproperties**  
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Robust Hyperproperty Preservation (**RHP**)

Robust Subset-Closed Hyperproperty Preservation (**RSCHC**)

Robust K-Subset-Closed Hyperproperty Preservation (**RKSCHP**)

Robust 2-Subset-Closed Hyperproperty Preservation (**R2SCHP**)

Robust Hypersafety Preservation (**RHSC**)

Robust K-Hypersafety Preservation (**RKHSP**)

Robust 2-Hypersafety Preservation (**R2HSP**)


*Robust Termination-Insensitive Noninterference Preservation (RTINIP)*

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Robust Trace Property Preservation (**RTP**)


Robust Dense Property Preservation (**RDP**)

Robust Safety Property Preservation (**RSP**)






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


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**No one-size-fits-all security criterion**

**More secure**



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**+ data confidentiality**

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**only integrity**

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
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
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
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# Robust Trace Property Preservation

## property-based characterization

$\forall$  source programs.

$\forall \pi$  trace property.



what one might want to achieve

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
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## property-free characterization

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$\forall$  (bad/attack) trace  $t$ .




what one might want to achieve

how one can prove it




# Some of the proof difficulty is manifest in property-free characterization



back-translating  
prog & context & trace  
 $\forall P \forall C_T \forall t \exists C_S \dots$




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
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
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
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(i.e. robust behavioral equivalence preservation)



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
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without internal nondeterminism,  
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**doesn't imply any other criterion**

**Full abstraction **does not** imply  
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
- Full abstraction only ensures **code confidentiality**

- **no** integrity, **no** safety, **no** data confidentiality, ...



# Embraced and extended™ proof techniques


for simple translation from statically to dynamically typed language with first-order functions and I/O



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
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[Jeffrey & Rathke, ESOP'05]  
[Patrignani et al, TOPLAS'15]

# Some open problems

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- **Verifying robust satisfaction for source programs**
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- **Different traces for source and target semantics**
  - connected by some arbitrary relation
  - mappings between source and target properties
  - interesting even for correct compilation

# My dream: secure compilation at scale



language

HACL\*


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
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
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
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
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