

Journey Beyond Full Abstraction: Exploring Robust Property Preservation for Secure Compilation



**Carmine
Abate**

Inria Paris



**Rob
Blanco**

Inria Paris




**Deepak
Garg**

MPI-SWS



**Cătălin
Hrițcu**

Inria Paris



**Jérémy
Thibault**

Inria Paris



**Marco
Patrignani**

Stanford
& CISA

<https://github.com/secure-compilation/exploring-robust-property-preservation>

**Good programming languages provide
helpful abstractions for writing more secure code**

Good programming languages provide helpful abstractions for writing more secure code

- structured control flow, procedures, modules, interfaces, correctness and security specifications, ...

Good programming languages provide helpful abstractions for writing more secure code

- structured control flow, procedures, modules, interfaces, correctness and security specifications, ...

abstractions not enforced when compiling and linking with adversarial low-level code

Good programming languages provide helpful abstractions for writing more secure code

- structured control flow, procedures, modules, interfaces, correctness and security specifications, ...

abstractions not enforced when compiling and linking with adversarial low-level code

- all source-level security guarantees are lost
- linked low-level code can read and write data and code, jump to arbitrary instructions, smash the stack, ...

Secure compilation chains

- **Protect source-level abstractions**
even against linked adversarial low-level code

Secure compilation chains

- **Protect source-level abstractions**
even against linked adversarial low-level code
 - various **enforcement mechanisms** possible: processes, SFI, ...
 - shared responsibility: compiler, linker, loader, OS, HW

Secure compilation chains

- **Protect source-level abstractions**
even against linked adversarial low-level code
 - various **enforcement mechanisms** possible: processes, SFI, ...
 - shared responsibility: compiler, linker, loader, OS, HW
- **Enable source-level security reasoning**
 - if source program **is secure** against all **source** contexts then compiled program **is secure** against all **target** contexts

Secure compilation chains

- **Protect source-level abstractions**
even against linked adversarial low-level code
 - various **enforcement mechanisms** possible: processes, SFI, ...
 - shared responsibility: compiler, linker, loader, OS, HW
- **Enable source-level security reasoning**
 - if source program **is secure** against all **source** contexts then compiled program **is secure** against all **target** contexts
 - but what should "is secure" mean?

What properties should we robustly preserve?

What properties should we robustly preserve?

trace properties
(safety & liveness)

What properties should we robustly preserve?

hyperproperties
(noninterference)

trace properties
(safety & liveness)

What properties should we robustly preserve?

**relational
hyperproperties**
(trace equivalence)

hyperproperties
(noninterference)

trace properties
(safety & liveness)

What properties should we robustly preserve?

relational hyperproperties
(trace equivalence)

Robust Relational Hyperproperty Preservation (RrHP)

Robust K-Relational Hyperproperty Preservation (RKRHP)

Robust 2-Relational Hyperproperty Preservation (R2rHP)

Robust Relational Property Preservation (RrTP)

Robust K-Relational Property Preservation (RKRTP)

Robust 2-Relational Property Preservation (R2rTP)

Robust Relational XSafety Preservation (RrSP)

Robust Finite-Relational XSafety Preservation (RFRSC)

Robust K-Relational XSafety Preservation (RKRSP)

Robust 2-Relational XSafety Preservation (R2rSP)

+ determinacy

Robust Trace Equivalence Preservation (RTEP)

hyperproperties
(noninterference)

Robust Hyperproperty Preservation (RHP)

Robust Subset-Closed Hyperproperty Preservation (RSCHC)

Robust K-Subset-Closed Hyperproperty Preservation (RKSCHP)

Robust 2-Subset-Closed Hyperproperty Preservation (R2SCHP)

Robust Hypersafety Preservation (RHSC)

Robust K-Hypersafety Preservation (RKHSP)

Robust 2-Hypersafety Preservation (R2HSP)


Robust Termination-Insensitive Noninterference Preservation (RTINIP)

trace properties
(safety & liveness)

Robust Trace Property Preservation (RTP)

Robust Dense Property Preservation (RDP)

Robust Safety Property Preservation (RSP)




What properties should we robustly preserve?

relational hyperproperties
(trace equivalence)

hyperproperties
(noninterference)

trace properties
(safety & liveness)



More secure




More efficient to enforce
Easier to prove

What properties should we robustly preserve?

relational hyperproperties
(trace equivalence)

hyperproperties
(noninterference)

trace properties
(safety & liveness)
only integrity



More secure




More efficient to enforce
Easier to prove

What properties should we robustly preserve?

relational hyperproperties
(trace equivalence)

hyperproperties
(noninterference)
+ data confidentiality

trace properties
(safety & liveness)
only integrity



More secure



More efficient to enforce
Easier to prove

What properties should we robustly preserve?

relational hyperproperties
(trace equivalence)


+ code confidentiality

hyperproperties
(noninterference)

+ data confidentiality

trace properties
(safety & liveness)

only integrity




More secure




More efficient to enforce
Easier to prove


Journey Beyond Full Abstraction




Journey Beyond Full Abstraction



Journey Beyond Full Abstraction



Journey Beyond Full Abstraction




without internal nondeterminism,
full abstraction is here

doesn't imply any of our criteria
 (even assuming compiler correctness)

no one-size-fits-all criterion!

Journey Beyond Full Abstraction



PostDocs & Starting Researchers @ Inria Paris

without internal nondeterminism, **full abstraction is here**

doesn't imply any of our criteria (even assuming compiler correctness)

no one-size-fits-all criterion!