Formally Verified Security

Current group:

Talk - Cătălin Hrițcu (Faculty)

Posters - Cezar Andrici (PhD)

- Jérémy Thibault (PhD)
- Rob Blanco (PostDoc)

Discuss - Maxi Wuttke (PhD)

- Dongjae Lee (Intern)

Alumni:

- Carmine Abate (PhD)
- Théo Winterhalter (PostDoc)
- Adrien Durier (PostDoc)
- Aïna Linn Georges (Intern)

+ many more before MPI-SP

Secure Compilation of Secure Source Programs

- **Suppose we have a secure source program ...**
  - For instance formally verified in F* [POPL'16,'17,'18,'20, ICFP'17,'19, ...]
  - e.g. EverCrypt verified crypto library, shipping in Firefox, Linux Kernel, ...
  - e.g. simple verified web server, linking with unverified libraries (Cezar's poster)
- **What happens when we compile such a verified program and link it with adversarial low-level code?**
  - low-level code that can be buggy, vulnerable, compromised, malicious
  - **currently: all guarantees are lost, lower-level attacks become possible**
  - **secure compilation: protect the source abstractions all the way down**



Secure Compilation of Vulnerable Source Programs

- **Insecure languages like C enable devastating vulnerabilities**
- **Mitigate vulnerabilities by compartmentalizing the program**
- **We don't know which compartments will be compromised**
  - protect vulnerable C compartments from each other
- **We don't know when a compartment will be compromised**
  - every compartment should receive protection until compromised

Secure Compilation

ERC SG SECOMP



1. Security Goal

∀ security property π



Where π can e.g. be "the web server's private key is not leaked"

We explored many classes of properties one can preserve this way:
Journey Beyond Full Abstraction [CSF'19, ESOP'20, TOPLAS'21]

More interesting definition for vulnerable C compartments [CSF'16, CCS'18]

2. Security Enforcement

Large subset of C with compartments

CompCert verified C compiler extended with compartments

RISC-V ASM with compartments

magically secure semantics

Software-Fault Isolation

vanilla ASM

Done for simplified languages, yet to be ported to RISC-V

Micro-Policies: ASM with programmable tags

[POPL'14, S&P'15, ASPLOS'15, POST'18, CCS'18, CSF'23]

[PriSC'23, ongoing]

CHERI RISC-V capability machine

(inspiration for ARM Morello)

Hardware-accelerated enforcement

3. Security Proofs

- **Proving mathematically that our compilation chains achieve secure compilation**
  - such proofs generally **very difficult and tedious**
    - wrong conjectures for full abstraction survived for decades
    - 250 pages of proof on paper for toy compiler
  - we propose **more scalable proof techniques**
  - **machine-checked proofs** in the Coq and F* proof assistants
  - **systematic testing** to find wrong conjectures early [POPL'17, ICFP'13, ITP'15, JFP'16]

Testing and Proving Secure Compilation in Coq

Machine-checked proofs

Large subset of C with compartments

CompCert with compartments

RISC-V ASM with compartments

Scalable proof technique for secure compilation

- applied to simpler languages [CCS'18, CSF'22]
- now extending to CompCert with compartments
- reuses compiler correctness proof (extended!)
- aiming to finish secure compilation proof by July
  - milestone in terms of realism! all prior work toy!
- for details see poster by Jérémy and Rob

Software-Fault Isolation

vanilla ASM

Micro-Policies: ASM with programmable tags

Done for simpler languages, yet to be ported to RISC-V

Future verification challenge

CHERI RISC-V capability machine

Systematic testing

Future Plans on Formally Secure Compilation



SPECTRE

Stronger Security Goals

Preserve data confidentiality
against micro-architectural side-channel attacks,
for arbitrary compartmentalized programs in F*, C, or Wasm
(not only constant time crypto code)

Realistic Enforcement

ARM Morello capability machine

Capability passing

Better Proof Techniques

Verify capability backend